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ARGUMENT I 
SMITH'S MISINTERPRETS THE HOLDING OF 
SCHNUPHASE V. STOREHOUSE MARKETS, 
918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). 
Smith's argues that "the issue is still before the Court as to 
whether the unsafe condition was known, or should have been known, 
by exercise of reasonable care on the part of Defendant Smith's..." 
(Brief of Appellee Smith's - p. 16). 
Smith's then argues that there is no evidence that it knew, or 
should have known, of the defect giving rise to Mrs. McKay's injury 
and no evidence that Smith's could have foreseen the danger. 
Plaintiff McKay suggests that Smith's has misunderstood the holding 
of the Court in Schnuphase, and that there was adequate evidence of 
foreseeability presented to the Court. 
Both Canfield and Schnuphase support Plaintiff's position that 
the evidence presented creates an adequate question of fact as to 
the foreseeability of the danger posed by Smith's behavior, and the 
injury growing from the choices made by Smith's. The Court has 
asserted in Canfield that liability: 
"...usually requires that the store owner, its 
agents, or employees, actually create the 
condition or defect that results in an injury 
to a patron." Canfield v. Albertson's, Inc., 
841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) p. 1225. 
The Supreme Court in Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 
P.2d 476 (Utah 1996) determined that a predicate to application of 
the Canfield doctrine requires that there must be "...foreseeabi-
lity of an inheritently dangerous condition" and "...that foresee-
ability and inherent danger are key elements of a negligence action 
g:\data\pi\mckay\appeaI.rep 1 
under the second theory of liability." Schnuphase 918 P.2d at 479. 
In Canfield and Schnuphase, both fact situations arose from a 
dangerous condition of a temporary nature. The Utah Supreme Court 
made clear that situations involving unsafe conditions of a 
permanent nature had different applications: 
"The second class of cases involves some 
unsafe conditions of a permanent nature, such 
as: in the structure of the building...which 
was created or chosen by the defendant (or his 
agents), or for which he is responsible. In 
such circumstances, where the defendant either 
created the condition, or is responsible for 
it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and 
no further proof of notice is necessary." 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 478. 
That is precisely the condition which confronts Smith's. In 
this instance, Smith's created the hazard by building the store, or 
rather, by hiring agents which built the store on its behalf and at 
its behest. Actual notice of the defective condition is, there-
fore, not required under either Canfield or Schnuphase. However, 
foreseeability of the dangerous condition is required. The Trial 
Court, therefore, should have used the second prong of reasoning 
when it selected the standard used under Canfield and Schnuphase. 
The Trial Court erroneously applied the standard requiring 
knowledge of the defect causing the injury with no prior notice of 
the defect required. 
"The issue is still before the Court as to 
whether the unsafe condition was not known or 
should have been known by exercise of reason-
able care on the part of Defendant Smith's..." 
(See, TR 829 - Memorandum Decision, p. 5, 
attached as Addendum #1). 
The Trial Court should properly have used the standard 
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identified in Schnuphase - that being foreseeability of an 
inherently dangerous condition. 
Multiple instances of the foreseeability of the instrumentali-
ty of Mrs. McKay7s injury were addressed to the Trial Court and 
referenced in her Brief, summarized as follows: 
1. Smith's provided the specifications for an interior door 
to be utilized in an exterior application. See, TR at 1360. The 
chief engineer of the manufacturer of the door stated in his 
deposition that it would be "misuse" to have installed the U.S. 
Aluminum "interior use only" door in an exterior setting. See, TR 
at 1304. It is foreseeable that an injury might occur if Smith's 
installed a door in a Northern Utah store taken from specifications 
for a store in Central Arizona. (See, p. 5, para. 9 of Smith's 
Brief). 
2. Smith's failed to investigate why its Architect or his 
predecessor had designated an interior-use only door for an 
exterior setting. Had it done so, it might have discovered that 
water drainage, frost wedges, and weights in excess of two hundred 
fifty (250) pounds might cause a failure in that particular door. 
It is again foreseeable that Smith's failure to require the 
installation of the proper door could result in an injury when 
those factors play some role in the failure of that door. (See, TR 
at 730, Affidavit of Dr. McEntyre). 
3. Smith's has admitted that it had no policies, rules, 
standards and/or guidelines in effect at the time of the injury 
relative to maintenance, cleaning or upkeep of the door. (See, TR 
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at 693, 737-738). It is foreseeable that failure to clean, 
maintain, and/or provide upkeep on the door by Smith's could cause 
a door to fail leading to injury of its customers. It is likewise 
foreseeable that if store employees and co-workers were never 
instructed to clean the grating and never cleaned the grooves of 
the tracts of the threshold, that the accumulation of such debris 
could lead to a failure in the door mechanism. (See, TR at 730 and 
733) . 
That agents for Smith's may have failed to notify Smith's of 
its obligations to implement an appropriate cleaning and mainte-
nance program is a burden that Smith's must resolve by crossclaim 
with its agents as provided by the Schnuphase standard. 
4. In that same vein, if Co-Defendant/Appellee Crittenden 
Paint and Glass Company misled the general contractor, misled the 
architect, and misled Smith's itself by cropping off crucial 
warning language, the foreseeability of injuries growing from the 
deception must remain the responsibility of the principal, to be 
resolved through third party complaints and crossclaims. (See. TR 
at 1678-1679). 
5. If the architect which Smith's hired failed to apprehend 
the danger of installing an interior use-only door from Central 
Arizona into an exterior setting in Northern Utah, the responsi-
bility for that failure must rest between Smith's and its agents, 
without holding the injured victim hostage to any agency failures. 
Unrebutted evidence was presented that the door was not fit for the 
purpose intended. (See, Affidavit of Architect, Anthony Wegener, 
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TR at 454-5). That created a question of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
6. The same may be said for the failure of the general 
contractor to detect the dangers of the installation of the wrong 
door, as well as the failure of the manufacturer of the door to 
appropriately warn its potential customers of weight-bearing 
limitations and maintenance requirements. (See, TR at 1250-1251). 
In no instance can it be said to fairly impose upon Mrs. McKay the 
obligation to have been alerted to the failures by Smith's and its 
agents. 
7. Evidence was presented at the Trial Court regarding the 
negligence of each of the other co-defendants as follows: 
(a) U.S. Aluminum warned potential purchasers that the 
door in question was limited to interior-use only. However, it is 
a question of fact as to whether it properly warned such purchasers 
that the stainless steel cap was susceptible to deformation if not 
properly cleaned and maintained, whether weight in excess of two 
hundred fifty (250) pounds might cause deformation of the track 
and, therefore, lead to injury (See, TR at 1240) , or whether 
exposure in a high-altitude, Northern Utah setting, might cause a 
frost wedge to work the stainless steel cap off the track, leading 
to a hazardous situation. See, TR at 1240 and 1241. 
(b) Crittenden Paint and Glass, intentionally or 
otherwise, cropped the warning words "for interior applications 
only" off each page submitted to the architect and the general 
contractor. See, TR at 1678 and 1679. It is a question of fact as 
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to whether or not supplying that warning to both the architect and 
the general contractor would have made any difference in those 
defendants issuing a warning to Smith's - even though Smith's may 
be presumed to have understood the warning in light of its prior 
approval of the door in question. 
(c) Defendant Chamberlin should have known that it would be 
inappropriate to have allowed the installation of an "interior-use 
only" door at an exterior site. See, TR at 730. It becomes a 
question of fact as to whether his Nuremburg-type defense "I was 
only doing what I was told" would overcome his obligation as the 
General Architect ultimately responsible for the whole project. 
See, TR at 1375 and 1376. 
(d) R&O Construction hired Crittenden Paint and Glass, and 
should be responsible for the negligent or intentional conduct of 
its subcontractors. See. TR at 1599. Any allocation of liability 
for the omissions of R&O Construction is within the province of the 
trier of fact. 
The Schnuphase Court recognized the ultimate responsibility of 
the store owner in such cases when it observed: 
"[The] essential element in method of opera-
tion claims is that the condition created by 
the defendant is of such a character that the 
defendant has or should have notice of an 
inherently dangerous condition." (See, 
Randall v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 
1993)). 
When Appellee Smith's chose the wrong door for Logan, Utah, 
when it failed to investigate the risks of using the wrong door in 
Logan, Utah, and failed to clean and maintain the door, it was 
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certainly foreseeable that the door might fail and create an 
inherently dangerous situation for its patrons. Responsibility 
must, therefore, lie with Appellee Smith7s and its agents. Other-
wise, every merchant throughout the State will attempt to create 
immunity for itself by making poor decisions, remaining 
intentionally ignorant of the risks of its poor decisions, and have 
no incentive to avoid sloppy maintenance and cleaning policies. 
All such behavior would constitute insulation for the merchant from 
the injuries which its poor practices might cause. Application of 
such a doctrine would result in immunity from any liability 
whatsoever. Judge Low accepted that dangerous premise when he 
observed: 
"Under the facts here shown, Smith,s had no 
reason to know of the existence of a steel 
cap, much less that it might fail under 
conditions of dirt, ice, debris or heavy 
loads." (See TR 831-832 - Memorandum 
Decision, p. 7-8). 
What the Judge failed to recall was the evidence and admis-
sions by Smith7s itself that Smith's chose the door containing the 
steel cap, Smith's chose the Architect which approved the door 
having the steel cap, Smith's hired the General Contractor which 
allowed the installation of the wrong door which had a steel cap, 
and Smith's consented to the hiring of the subcontractor which 
cropped off the evidence that the door was inappropriate for an 
exterior application. It is inappropriate to insulate Smith's from 
the consequences of its choices by asserting that it had no reason 
to know of the existence of a steel cap which ultimately injured 
Mrs. McKay. Further, constructive knowledge of the defect in the 
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door could reasonably be inferred from Smith7s faulty cleaning 
practices. (See, Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 486 S.E. 2d 285 (VA 
1997)) . 
ARGUMENT II 
JUDGE LOW MISAPPLIED THE CANFIELD-SCHNUPHASE STANDARD. 
In his Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1996, Judge Low 
consistently misapplies the appropriate standard established by the 
Court in Canfield and reaffirmed in Schnuphase. In the second line 
of cases established by the Canfield decision, notice is 
unnecessary if: 
"...the store owner, its agents, or employees 
actually create the condition or defect that 
results in an injury to a patron [or] where 
the store owner's method of operation creates 
a situation where it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the expectable acts of third parties will 
create a dangerous condition or defect." 
Canfield. p. 1225. 
In such a circumstance where a store owner chooses such a 
method of operation, the injured party "...need not prove either 
actual or constructive knowledge of the specific condition." 
Notice is satisfied as a matter of law because the store owner is 
deemed to be informed of the dangerous condition since it adopted 
the method of operation. 
The Court indicated: 
"The second class of cases involves some 
unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such 
as: in the structure of the building. . .which 
was created or chosen by the defendant (or his 
agents), or for which he is responsible. In 
such circumstances, where the defendant either 
created the condition, or is responsible for 
it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and 
no further proof of notice is ' necessary." 
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Schnuphase 918 P.2d at 479. [emphasis added] 
Throughout his entire Memorandum Decision, Judge Low mis-
apprehends that standard and seeks to impose on Mrs. McKay the 
obligation of proving that Smith's knew of the underlying defect in 
the door that it chose: 
1. ".. .There is no showing that Smith's was aware.. .that the 
door was not designated for outdoor use..." See, TR at 827 -
Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 3. [Emphasis added.] 
2. "There was nothing to show [that defendant knew or should 
have known] that the raising of the stainless steel cap was caused 
by an ice wedge..." See, TR at 827 - Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Low, p. 3. [Emphasis added.] 
3. "There is no showing that [the defendant knew or should 
have known that] the track was raised as a result of dirt or heavy 
use." See TR at 827-828 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, 
p. 3-4. [Emphasis added.] 
4. "The landowner is liable for damages resulting in 
physical harm caused to invitees by a condition of the land only if 
he knows...of the condition and realizes it would involve unreason-
able risk or harm to invitees." See TR at 828-829 - Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low, p. 4-5. [emphasis added] 
5. "The issue is still before the Court as to whether the 
unsafe condition was known or should have been known by... 
Smith's..." See, TR at 829 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 
5. [emphasis added] 
6. "What is at issue is whether defendant Smith's had an 
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obligation to do anything other than what it did in order to be 
aware of or remedy the situation." See, TR at 830 - Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low, p. 6. [emphasis added] 
7. "There simply is no evidence that...Smith's knew...that 
installing such [an interior] door in an exterior location would 
involve unreasonable risk of harm to invitees." See, TR at 831 -
Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 7. [emphasis added] 
8. "That dirt, ice or other contaminants '...may be the 
underlying cause of the door's failure, there is no showing that 
Smith's was...aware of...that risk7". See, TR at 831 - Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low, p. 7. [emphasis added] 
9. "No warning was provided to Smith' s... that ice, dirt, 
debris or heavy loads would cause...the type of damage to the door 
which occurred." See, TR at 831 - Memorandum Decision of Judge 
Low, p. 7. [emphasis added] 
10. "Smith's had no reason to know [that the steel cap] might 
fail..." See, TR at 833 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 9. 
[emphasis added] 
11. "Liability can only be imposed when.•.defendant knew or 
should have known of the condition. . ." See, TR at 833 - Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low, p. 9. [emphasis added] 
12. "Because there is no evidence that Smith's knew of the 
cap coming free... summary judgment for Smith's is appropriate." 
See, TR at 833 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 9. [emphasis 
added] 
Those citations from the Memorandum Decision make it 
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abundantly clear that Judge Low simply misapplied the Canfield and 
Schnuphase prong adopted by this Court - which prong wholly and 
completely eliminates the obligation for notice to the merchant or 
knowledge of the merchant in those select circumstances where the 
merchant is in control of the dangerous instrumentality: 
"We, therefore, reiterate the rule set forth 
in De Weese, that where the store owner 
chooses a method of operation where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable 
acts of third parties will create a dangerous 
condition, an injured party need not prove 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the 
specific condition." Id. at 901. Canfield v. 
Albertson's, Inc. , 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992 at 1225). 
Judge Low also commented on the evidence presented: 
"The testimony is uncontested that [Smith's] 
did have a cleaning and maintenance program, 
though not specifically focused on the track 
of the door..." See TR at 828 - Memorandum 
Decision of Judge Low, p. 4. 
Smith's cleaning and maintenance policy for the rest of the 
store is immaterial. It was uncontested that there was no 
maintenance, cleaning or upkeep policy whatsoever by Smith's 
relative to the door itself. See, Record at 693, 695, 696, 737 and 
738. Whatever other maintenance and cleaning program might have 
been used in the rest of the store is not central to the issues 
before this Court. 
Judge Low acknowledges:".. .that the door in question was under 
the control of the defendant." Memorandum Decision of Judge Low at 
p. 5, further acknowledges the possibility that dirt, ice, or other 
contaminants "...may be the underlying cause of the door's failure. 
There is not a showing that Smith's was ...aware of...that risk." 
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See, TR at 831 - Memorandum Decision of Judge Low, p. 7. 
By acknowledging that the control of the door was Smith's 
responsibility, that the original purchase and installation of the 
door was under the control of Smith's, and that the various factors 
giving rise to the failure of the steel cap such as cleaning and 
maintaining of the track were under the control of Smith's or its 
agents, the Court should have correctly applied the applicable 
standard set forth in Canfield and Schnuphase. The Court failed to 
apply that standard to the facts of the present case. By applying 
the wrong standard, prejudicial error was committed. 
REPLY AS TO U.S. ALUMINUM, 
CRITTENDEN PAINT AND GLASS, 
CHAMBERLIN, AND R&O CONSTRUCTION 
SMITH'S IS LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS AGENTS 
In the ten page Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on May 
7, 1996, two sentences are devoted collectively to the motions for 
summary judgment filed by Crittenden Paint and Glass Company and 
R&O Construction. U.S. Aluminum received one sentence and 
Chamberlin was dismissed summarily several months later. Virtually 
the entire basis for granting summary judgment for these defendants 
is focused on Smith's and its knowledge and behavior. One can 
conclude that the Court felt that if Smith's was entitled to 
summary judgment, then the other defendants were likewise entitled. 
In fact, that is precisely what the Court said: "Largely for the 
reasons above stated [the prior nine and a half pages] and for the 
reason set forth in [the Memoranda submitted by the other 
defendants], the same are granted." See, TR at 834 - Memorandum 
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Decision of Judge Low, pp. 10. 
The Trial Court believed that if Mrs. McKay had no claim 
against Smith's, then she had no claim against parties with whom 
she had no connection, claim, or interest. However, if this Court 
of Appeals reverses and remands the matter for trial to the 
District Court as to Smith's it should likewise reverse and remand 
as to all other defendants, inasmuch as the other defendants were 
each acting as agents for Smith's. The proportionate share of 
liability those defendants owed to Mrs. McKay through the 
principal, Smith's, is an issue more appropriately determined by a 
trier of fact at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is simply unreasonable to require a Plaintiff to visually 
inspect each foot fall and to look continuously at the floor for 
defects. Mrs. McKay was entitled to assume that Smith's and its 
agents had exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe for 
her to return two videos rented from the store. So long as she 
exercised the prudence that an ordinarily careful person would use 
in a like situation, she should be entitled to recompense for her 
injuries. There is a reasonable question of fact based upon the 
unrebutted Affidavits submitted by Plaintiff, and the admissions by 
Smith's and its agents. The Trial Court utilized the standard 
established in the first prong of cases described in Canfield and 
Schnuphase when it should have used the second prong dealing with 
foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition. That fore-
seeability issue is amply addressed in the trial record. The 
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decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and remanded. 
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Respectfully submitted 
HH..LYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN, P.C. 
Herm Olsen 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEPHANIE MCKAY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH'S FOOD STORE AND DRUG 
CENTERS INC., et al 
Defendant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 940000025 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT upon a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The hearing was conducted on March 25, 1996, and the 
Court allowed additional time for filing of supplemental memoranda 
and affidavits. However, the Court forgot that additional time was 
allowed for such filing and had taken the matter under advisement 
and issued a Memorandum Decision prior to Plaintiff's counsel 
having the opportunity to supplement the record. Upon realizing 
the error, the Memorandum Decision then was set aside and the 
matter thereafter reviewed afresh considering the supplemental 
memoranda, affidavits, and documents supplied by the parties. 
Having done so, the Court now reaffirms its earlier Memorandum 
Decision. 
In order to block a Motion for Summary Judgment, the party 
against whom the Motion is brought must show that there exists 
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There is no showing from the Plaintiff that in Smith's 
ordering and installing of the door, even though it was perhaps not 
specifically designed by the manufacturer for outdoor use, 
contributed to the injury. More specifically, there is no showing 
that Smith's was aware or had any reason to become aware of the 
fact that the door was not designated for outdoor use or more 
importantly, that its use in the location in the store was a breach 
of duty to the Plaintiff. What the Plaintiff has shown by expert 
opinion is the mechanism by which, or how, the door track failed 
and why it failed. 
The Plaintiff has suggested that the Defendant had a duty of 
ordinary care toward her in selecting, installing, and maintaining 
the door track in question. That is true, but there is nothing to 
indicate that ordering and installing a door, even if it was 
designed for inside use only, was in fact a negligent act. It must 
be shown that the duty was one that could or should have been known 
to the Defendant and that the duty was breached. There is nothing 
herein to indicate that the Defendant should have known that the 
door was an inappropriate door or even if Defendant did, that it 
was subject to the type of problems experienced. There was nothing 
to show if in fact the raising of the stainless steel cap was 
caused by an ice wedge and that the Defendant knew or should have 
known that would result. There is no showing that, if in fact the 
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by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and 
realizes that it involves unreasonable risk or harm to invitees. 
The undisputed facts contain no evidence that the Defendant knew, 
should have known, or by reasonable care could have discovered the 
condition which apparently caused the injury to the Plaintiff. 
The Defendant has cited both English v. Kienke 848 P. 2d 153 
(Utah 1993) and Laws v. Blandina Citv. 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (cited?) . It is settled that the Defendant, though it may 
have a high duty of care to invitees, is not strictly liable to 
injuries occurring to the invitee. Additionally, Plaintiff 
distinguishs slip and fall cases such as related to food or things 
of that nature on a floor caused by third parties as opposed to 
dangerous conditions under the exclusive control of, or caused or 
created by, the Defendant as to the issue of negligence and the 
standard to be applied. Here, there is no question that the door 
in question was under the control of the Defendant. That does not, 
however, indicate in and of itself, that in fact a dangerous 
condition came into existence for which the Defendant is liable. 
Strict liability is not the standard for possessors or owners of 
land in Utah. The issue is still before the Court as to whether 
the unsafe condition was known or should have been known by 
exercise of reasonable care on the part of Defendant Smith's and 
- ^ 
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been anticipated and was a contributing factor in its failure", is 
insufficient to refer the matter to a jury. That, if the Defendant 
did not carefully keep the tracks or grooves of the doors clean at 
all times which may have allowed rocks, ice, and debris to interact 
with the traffic of the doors resulting in deformation of the 
product, does not demonstrate negligence. Plaintiff must show that 
failure to do so should have suggested to Smith's that the same 
involved unreasonable risk and harm to the invitees. There simply 
is no evidence that if the door was designed for interior use only 
that Smith's knew of that fact or that installing such door in an 
exterior location would involve unreasonable risk or harm to 
invitees. 
More specifically, with respect to whether the door failed as 
a result of dirt, ice or other contaminates, though that may be the 
underlying cause of the door's failure, there is not a showing that 
Smith's was or could have been reasonably aware of, or reasonably 
foreseen, that risk. No warning was provided to Smith's nor has 
there been any reason shown that a reasonable person should 
understand that ice, dirt, debris or heavy loads would cause the 
type of damage to the door which occurred. Under the facts here 
shown, Smith's had no reason to know of the existence of a steel 
cap much less that it might fail under conditions of dirt, ice, 
debris or heavy loads. Again, the burden is -on the Plaintiff to 
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become loose and cause a hazard to the Plaintiff. The Court can 
only conclude that accepting the Plaintiff's theory in this matter 
would seek to hold the Defendant liable for any defect on the 
premise regardless whether Smith's had any reason to know of the 
actual hazard or that its activity may contribute to the hazard and 
would in fact require the store owner to be strictly liable and 
place the store owner in a position of insurer. That is not the 
standard. If it were the standard, then Plaintiff would be 
entitled to summary judgment in her favor on the issue of liability 
and there would be no issue except for damages for the trier of 
fact. Plaintiff is not entitled under the case law to a summary 
judgment because this is not a strict liability case, it is one of 
negligence and the Plaintiff is unable to show that her injuries, 
as severe as they may be, were caused by negligent acts of the 
Defendant. Liability can only be imposed when there is some 
evidence that the Defendant knew or should have known of the 
condition and realized that it posed an unreasonable risk of harm 
to its patrons. Because there is no evidence that Smith's knew of 
the cap coming free or it should have known of the dangers of the 
cap coming free, summary judgment for Smith's is appropriate. As 
pointed out by the Defendant's Memorandum, to submit this matter to 
the jury would require the jury to speculate that the Defendant 
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